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THREAT SCENARIOS IN THE UKRAINE CONFLICT
Daniel WEISS1
Abstract:  This  paper explores  metaphors  used  in  Russian  and Ukrainian parliamentary  and TV
debates during the Ukraine conflict from November 2013 to November 2015. It adopts proximisation
theory to the target domain of approaching danger illustrated by different source domains (motion,
border  crossing,  disease,  fire  and  explosives).  It  thus  showcases  the  plight  of  a  country  whose
territorial integrity has been violated and whose nationhood is questioned by its powerful neighbour
and former dominator.
Keywords:  proximisation  theory;  Ukraine  conflict;  disease/  fire/  motion  metaphor;  metonymy;
political discourse; threat
Introduction: the theoretical approach
The present study is based on a sample of about six hundred metaphors related to the Ukraine
conflict and dating from November 2013 to November 2015.2 The study portrays metaphors
describing an approaching danger which were used in Ukrainian and Russian parliamentary
debates and TV talk shows during the first phase of the Ukrainian conflict (2014).3 This topic
invites an analysis in terms of proximisation theory, whose main characteristics, as well as its
shortcomings and their possible solutions, have been outlined elsewhere (Weiss 2017). Due to
reasons  of  space,  it  may  suffice  here  to  mention  that  the  theory  has  to  do  with
“representational  ‘proximising’  of  the  subjectively  remote.”4 The  events  in  question  are
located on the spatial, temporal and modal (later: axiological) axes of a cognitive model that
was first illustrated by an analysis of Bill Clinton’s TV speech on 24 March 1999 after the
beginning of the NATO intervention against Serbia in the Kosovo war (Chilton 2004: 144).5
In Chilton’s later work, the modal axis was renamed into axis of ideological distance, in Cap
2013 it  appears  as  axis  of  axiological  proximisation.6  Both  Chilton  and Cap narrow the
neologism proximis-e/-ation, which etymologically denotes an emotionally neutral concept, to
the description of a discourse strategy that aims at depicting a direct or indirect threat and thus
causing fear  and anger, which will  legitimise the speaker’s/author’s preventive or  reactive
steps.7
1 University of Zurich, Slavic Department.
2 Out of this set, one hundred and ninety examples taken from Russian TV debates stem from an unpublished
MA thesis (Brunner 2015).
3 The  study is  related  to  a  research  project  entitled  “The  Ukraine  conflict  as  a  battlefield  of  conflicting
legitimisation  discourses.”  It  covered  the  period  from  22  November  2013  until  15  March  2015  and
encompassed four countries (Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Czech Republic) and four discourse types: government
statements (speeches, interviews, press releases, press conferences), parliamentary debates, TV discussions and
newspapers articles and reports.  In  the present study, the examples stem exclusively from the Russian and
Ukrainian  corpora.  For  details  of  methodology,  data  selection  and  theoretical  approaches  cf.
http://www.research-projects.uzh.ch/p21358.htm.
4 Chilton 2004: 153.
5 For details cf. Chilton (2004: 144 ff.).
6 The first  adoption of this theory to metaphors  used in US administration sources relating to the Ukraine
conflict has been presented in the doctoral dissertation Lichy 2015.
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Before tackling metaphors that contribute to this intimidating strategy, it should be
emphasized that in the case of the Ukrainian conflict, we are dealing with a more complex
scenario than in B. Clinton’s intervention in the Kosovo war or G. Bush’s War on terror (Cap
2013). On the time axis, we see a two-stage proximisation process on both conflicting sides.
Russia already felt threatened by the extension of EU and NATO in 2004. The Majdan revolt
allegedly added to this the endangerment of the Russian community and language in Ukraine
and  especially  on  the  Crimean  Peninsula.  From the  perspective  of  the  Majdan  winners,
Ukraine likewise faced a long-term threat:  this line of argumentation pointed back to the
defeat  of  the  Ukrainian  independence  movement  after  WW I and Stalin’s anti-Ukrainian
repressions including the holodomor famine in the early thirties. The short-term threat arose
with Russia’s intervention in the Crimea and the Donbass. In the case of Russia, the two-
stage proximisation also involved two different spaces:  the long-term threat aimed at  the
deictic centre (the Russian Federation), whereas the short-term threat affected the periphery
inhabited by the “Russkij mir”, a term denoting the ethnic Russian inhabitants of countries
outside the Russian Federation.
A  final  remark  concerns  the  relation  between  metaphors  and  comparisons.  The
traditional but debatable understanding of metaphors as abbreviated comparisons has been
somewhat downgraded in conceptual metaphor theory. Still, the terms similarity and analogy
have  not  been  banned  from  its  metalanguage.  Thus,  the  subtitle  of  Musolff  (2004)  is
“Analogical Reasoning in Debates about Europe,” Kövecses opposes the “as if-connection”
for  metaphors  to  the  “through-connection”  for  metonymies,9 and  Charteris-Black asserts:
“There is some psycho-linguistic evidence that when metaphors are first introduced they are
processed by means of comparison”.10 All this justifies the inclusion of metaphors (together
with  metonymies)  into  a  new  overarching category  under  the  umbrella  term ‘analogical
reasoning’,11 which  embraces  explicit  comparisons,  metaphors  and  analogies  conveyed
indirectly by quotations. This category is also essential for the present study: it enables us to
integrate many relevant comparisons co-occurring with metaphors in our material.
The data
When searching for  metaphors,  the  automatic  “metaphor identification procedure” (MIP)
developed by the Pragglejaz group was not employed since it has no Polish, Ukrainian and
Czech application and provided even in its Russian version (Zajchenko 2011) rather poor
results: due to its wide scope, it yields too many trivial or even dead metaphors; at the same
time, it cannot cope with innovative metaphors. Therefore, the metaphors had to be extracted
in a non-automatic way by close reading. The examples were mainly collected according to
their degree of conventionality: the more innovative they looked, the easier they found their
way into the collection. Although I did not take a quantitative approach to metaphors, it was
tempting to test the procedure proposed by Charteris-Black (2014: 179), which based on a
reference corpus postulates the following statistical thresholds: if a word with the specific
meaning at hand occurs in ≥ 5% of all corpus entries of this word, it is considered a novel
metaphor, between 5% and 50% a conventional and above 50% an entrenched metaphor. In
Weiss  (2018),  the  application  of  this  test  to  the  Ukrainian  data  is  discussed  in  detail,
7 A broader understanding of proximisation is proposed by Kopytowska (2015), who also postulates five different
axes, including the emotional and epistemic axes.
9 Kövecses (2014:20).
10 Charteris­Black (2015: 171). This refers to Bowdle and Gentner (2007), who postulate “a shift in mode of
mapping from comparison to categorization.”
11 For details see Weiss 2017.
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including the difficulties posed by the choice of an adequate reference corpus as well as the
exclusion of dead metaphors.
       The simplest source of proximisation metaphors is provided by the source domain
‘motion’.  It  may  be  realised  by  expressions  of  walking,  regardless  of  the  degree  of
frozenness.  One of  its  well-attested  subdomains  is  ‘border  crossing’.  It  mostly provides
entrenched metaphors as in “Ci zahrozy peretnut’ evropejs’kyj kordon” (these threats will
cross the European border).1 The speaker whose utterance is rendered in example (3) below
states that “Rosija zajšla za mežu” (Russia has crossed the dividing line).2 Unlike kordon,
meža does not mark a physical border: this act of crossing is located on the axiological axis.
The proverbial red line points to the same direction. The next speaker combines it with an
appropriate physical impairment metaphor:
(1)  У міжнародній політиці є таке визначення "червона лінія". Завжди кажуть, що,
"якщо  перейдуть  червону  лінію,  то  ми  приймемо  додаткові  рішення,  ми
розглянемо  додаткові  санкції,  то  ми  посилимо  тиск".  Просто  хотів  би
звернутися,  щоб  світ  не  страждав  геополітичним  дальтонізмом,  а  то  вже
перейдено не десятки, а сотні  червоних ліній, тисячі загиблих із-за російської
військової агресії.12               
       A temporal concept of border is involved when O.  Turčinov, then  member of the
Ukrainian government,  reminds the Speaker of the Russian State Duma Naryškin that
“voennye prestuplenija ne imejut sroka davnosti, vaša strana sejčas perexodit očen’ opasnuju
čertu”  (war crimes do not have an expiry date.  Your  country  is  now  crossing  a  very
dangerous line).13
      A metaphorical  idiom implying  ‘motion’ appears  in  the  following  statement  of  a
communist Duma deputy following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea:
(2)  Я уже сказал, что англо-американский империализм уже одной ногой стоит на
территории  Украины,  сейчас  пауза,  а  далее  будут  действия,  как  во  многих
странах мира.14
          The somewhat underdetermined closure of this fragment implies that the proximisation
process will  go on and the personified imperialism (this  term is  nowadays used only by
communists) might also set his second leg on Ukrainian soil.  
The  walking  imagery  that  serves  to  depict  the  endangerment  may  also  be  expressed
metonymically. A participant of a Ukrainian TV show uses the metonymy  Rosyjs’kyj sapoh
(Russian boot). The term sapoh belongs to the socially stigmatised mixed Ukrainian-Russian
variety  Suržyk and is actually of Russian origin, which iconically reflects the origin of the
intruder:
12 A. Jacenjuk, Verxovna Rada, 23 October 2014 (In international politics, there is this expression “red line”.
People always say that “if they cross the red line, we will consider additional sanctions, we will increase the
pressure”. I would just like to make sure that the world does not suffer from  geopolitical colour blindness,
because not only dozens but hundreds of red lines have been crossed, [we have] thousands of casualties because
of the Russian military aggression).
13 O. Turčinov, Verxovna Rada, 27 June 2014.
14 N. Rjabov, State Duma, 14 March 2014 (I’ve already said that the British-American imperialism already
stands with one leg on Ukrainian territory, now there is a break, but then will follow such actions as in many
countries of the world).
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 (3) Російський сапог прийшов […] Ми не можемо спокійно дивитися,  коли БТРи
спокійно розїжджають по Криму - це наша з вами земля.  Завтра вони підуть в
Одесу, післязавтра - в Луганськ. Далі - в Київ. Будемо дивитися спокійно? Ні.
Поки вони блокують без пострілу. Завтра вони почнуть провокації, …15  
           Unlike in the preceding example, this speaker anticipates further proximisation steps on
the  time  and  space  axes.  A right-wing  deputy  in  the  Ukrainian  parliament  uses  a  more
derogatory wording, this time in a historical reminiscence and with the Standard Ukrainian
term čobit ‘boot’:
 (4) Коли москальський брудний чобіт прийшов на мою рідну Львівську землю, коли
москальський брудний чобіт знищив  усі  українські  школи,  дитячі  садочки,  …
Шептицького заслав до білих ведмеді.16
           Compared with the preceding example, the repeated mention of the personified boot is
more repulsive here both with regard to its attributes (brudnyj,  moskal’skyj:  Moskal’ is a
pejorative ethnonym denoting Russians) as to its deeds (destruction, deportation). The white
bear is another metonymy closely associated with Russia’s North, which on the spatial and
emotional axes is more remote.
It  goes  without  saying  that  the  boot metonymy does  not  occur  in  Russian  pro-Kremlin
sources.17 On the other hand, a rather neutral variant is attested in an utterance by a critical
observer from the Doneck front, who in a stated that “at present, it would be incorrect and
premature  to  say that  the  boot  of  the  Russian  soldier has  already stepped on Ukrainian
soil.”18 Since here, the boot is simply conceived of as a belonging of the Russian soldier, the
whole phrase remains metonymical yet its negative load vanishes.
           A more playful version of the approaching danger is conveyed in the following joke
about V. Putin.
(5) Маленький  Путін  зайшов  у  великий  сяючий  золотом  Кремлівський
Георгієвський палац. Біля нього стояли два величезних охоронці. І він до них
повертається каже: "Извините, пожалуйста, а где здесь можно пописять"?  "Вам
- везде".  Тоді всі сміялися, здавалося, що це просто милий анекдот. Але нас-
правді  виявилося,  що  імперській  політиці  Путіна  вєздє.  І  той,  хто  сьогодні
сидить далеко-далеко в благополучній Європі - в Лондоні, Ліссабоні, Берліні,
Парижі, - має розуміти, що він пройде вєздє.19
15 A. Hrycenko, Verxovna Rada, 28 February 2014 (The Russian boot has come. We cannot quietly observe how
Russian troops are roaming through the Crimea – this is our territory. Tomorrow they will arrive at Odessa, the
day after tomorrow in Luhansk. Then in Kiev. Should we just patiently watch what’s going on? No. At present
they simply conduct blockades, without any shooting. Tomorrow they will launch provocations).
16 O. Pankevič, Verxovna Rada, 16 May 2014 (when the  dirty Muscovite boot came to my beautiful  L’viv
province,  when  the  dirty  Muscovite  boot destroyed  all  Ukrainian  schools,  kindergartens  …  it  deported
Šeptyc’kyj [the Greek-catholic metropolite of Galicia, whose imprisonment at the outbreak of World War I the
speaker is referring to DW] to the white bears)
17It may be noted that Soviet propagandistic cartoons in World War II often reduced the representation of Hitler
or the Nazis to a boot with the swastika.
18Russian oppositional TV channel Dožd’, 29 August 2014.
19J. Lucenko, TV debate Šuster live, 25 July 2014 (Little Putin once entered the great gold-shimmering George
Palace of the Kremlin. Next to him stood two big lifeguards. He addressed one of them: “Excuse me, where can
I piss here?” “Yoú [may] everywhere”. At that time everybody laughed, it seemed that this was just a good joke.
But in reality, it turned out that Putin’s imperial politicians were everywhere. And those who today sit far away
19
Note that the shock produced by V. Putin’s not too civilised language is mitigated by his age.
However, the physical  act  remains disgusting,  and V. Putin’s privilege to relieve himself
wherever he wants, which originally was meant as a humorous symbolisation of his power, is
now reinterpreted as an omnipresent menace for the whole of Europe.
A widespread metaphor for political  inferiority is  the posture verb  kneel  (Russian
stojat’ na kolenjax),  which is related to the universal conceptualisation ‘up is dominant’.
After the annexation of the Crimea, V. Putin was praised because he podnjal Rossiju s kolen
‘raised Russia up [lit.  from its  knees]’,  thus re-establishing Russia as a dreaded military
power. The following statement by a Ukrainian politician on an oppositional Russian radio
channel combines the posture verb and the subsequent, even more humiliating motion ‘crawl
on one’s knees’:
(6)  Складывается впечатление, что задача –  поставить на колени Украину, потому
что Украина не может нести груз этой войны долго, потому что Украина в очень
плохом экономическом состоянии (…) То есть  коллапс приближается со всех
сторон. Это фактически политика на изматывание и коллапс Украины, видимо с
тем расчетом, чтобы Украина, обессилев, приползла на коленях и согласилась на
любые условия.20
What is really approaching us here is the economic collapse that Russia is trying to
cause by blocking imports of Ukrainian goods and increasing the prices of oil and gas supply.
This produces a reversal of the usual picture predicted by proximisation theory: a centrifugal
motion  directed  towards  the  enemy on  both  the  spatial  and  axiological/emotional  axes.
Moreover,  the  motion  script  interacts  with  the  subordination  script,  which  is  attested  in
numerous other cases. For instance, a right-wing politician complains that Russians allow
themselves to wipe their shoes on Ukrainians as a kind of doormat (Ale čomu vony sobi
dozvoljajut’ vytiraty  ob nas nohy).21 The shoes  in  this  idiom play a  humiliating but  less
destructive  role  than  their  close relative  boot (example  4),  which  tramples  on Ukrainian
cultural values.
The motion concept may, of course, be realised otherwise than by walking and does not
necessarily  relate  to  a  threat  scenario.  A train  is  involved  when  Porošenko  accuses  his
predecessor Janukovič to ‘have attempted to re-direct our express train from the West to the
East’ (“sprobuvav na xodu rozvernuty naš ekspres iz Zaxodu na Sxid.”)22 This train metaphor
resumes an old Soviet tradition, which originated in Lenin’s “locomotive of the revolution”;
later on, the train came to symbolise the economic progress of the Soviet Union.23
in the prosperous Europe – in London, Lisbon, Berlin or Paris – should understand that he [Putin]  will get
through everywhere).
20 О. Ljaško, Radio Svoboda, 28 August 2014 (One gets the impression that the task is to bring Ukraine to its
knees, because  Ukraine  cannot  carry  the  burden  of  this  war,  because  Ukraine  is  in  a  very  bad  economic
condition… The collаpse is approaching from every side. This policy indeed aims at Ukraine’s exhaustion and
collapse with the expectation that Ukraine will crawl on its knees [to the enemy] and agree with every condition
whatsoever)
21 A. Jacenjuk, TV show Šuster live, 22 November 2013.
22  P. Porošenko, Verxovna rada, 16 September 2014.
23 Not surprisingly, there were no critical or even derogatory uses of the train metaphor in Soviet propaganda
comparable to those in the European discourse of the 1990s, where problem passengers, different speeds and the
risk of derailment are frequently discussed (Musolff 2000: 39-56).
20
A not  unusual  conceptualisation  is  ‘international  relations  is  trade’.  In  a  conflict
situation,  it  functions  solely  in  a  perverted  form  however:  the  export metaphor  targets
terrorism and other undesirable goods, as can be seen in the following fragment of a speech by
G. Bush: “If the Middle East remains a place where freedom and democracy do not flourish, it
will  remain  a  place  of  stagnation  and  anger  and  violence  for  export.”24 The  same  fear
manifests itself in a statement by the anchor man of a Russian TV show: “Ne proizojdet li
ėksport Majdana v Rossiju” (whether there won’t happen any export of Majdan to Russia).25
Here, the metaphor  ėksport  combines with the metonymy  Majdan. What could be exported
here is political disorder and instability, a risk which was given due attention by the Kremlin at
that  time.  On  the  other  side  of  the  border,  the  same  metaphor  targets  Russian  ongoing
activities, cf. “Krim eksportu nafty i gazu, Rosija stala eksportuvaty teroryzm” (Besides oil
and gas, Russia started exporting terrorism); this obviously refers to the separatist forces in the
South-East Donbass region, which are called “terrorists” by the Ukrainian government.26 The
only element of the source concept preserved in the export metaphor is ‘motion’; the meaning
‘commercial transaction’ is completely absent, since no merchandise or payment is involved.
Disease, Wild Animals, Fire
Among the other source domains, disease metaphors follow traditional patterns. Thus, before
the  upheaval,  Ukrainian  authorities  intended  to  “izbežat’ raspolzanie  kievskoj  zarazy”  (to
avoid a spread of the Kievan plague), referring to the Majdan partisans.27 After the change of
power, in the Ukrainian  Verxovna Rada disease metaphors target the Russian interventions:
“Puxlina totalitaryzmu provokuvatyme nebezpečnu xorobu” (The ulcer of totalitarianism will
provoke  a  dangerous  disease)28 or  “90%  žyteliv  Donbasu  prosjat’  zvil’nyty  jix  vid
terorystyčnoji zarazi” (90% of the Donbass inhabitants ask us to free them from the terrorist
plague).29 Parasites  are  another  familiar  element  from  the  propagandistic  arsenal:
“Vidšukalysja  ekstremisty,  kotri  namahajut’sja  parazytuvaty  na  boljučyx  pytannjax  našoho
narodu” (There have shown up extremists who try to parasitise on the aching problems of our
people).30
Animals provide a traditional source of threat metaphors. In our context, the Russian
bear, whose manifold embodiments are analysed in Weiss (2017), plays the most prominent
role in this zoo. The next fragment illustrates the interplay of the two source domains ‘animal’
and ‘disease’:
(7)  … США,  как бешеная собака,  бегают по  миру и  кусают страны,  заражая их
своим вирусом, и ждут, пока они очумеют, а потом набрасываются и догрызают!
Мощные и сильные страны: Россия —  бурый медведь, Индия —  слон, Китай —
саблезубый тигр,  дракон — давайте объединимся и дадим наконец отпор  этой
бешеной собаке, заставим её соблюдать интересы всего мирового сообщества!31
24Quoted from Cap 2013: 95.
25 V. Solov’ev, TV show Poedinok, 30 January 2014.
26A. Jacenjuk at a government session, 16 April 2014.
27 Kommersant, 28 January 2014.
28 O. Turčinov, 20 May 2014.
29 O. Ljaško, 4 June 2014.
30 M. Čečetov, 20 June 2014.
31 V.S. Zoločevskij, State Duma, 26 September 2014 (…the US is  running around like a mad dog and  biting
countries,  infecting them with its  virus, then waits until they go mad, and later it  pounces on them and  bites
them  to  death!  The  powerful  and  strong  nations,  Russia,  the  brown  bear,  China,  India,  the  elephant,  the
21
        Here, the  mad dog belongs to the two source domains ‘disease’ and ‘wild animals’,
which are now both exploited by the speaker. First, he elaborates the idea of disease, cf.
biting, infecting, virus, go mad, pounces, bites to death.  The target of this mapping (what
kind of disease?) remains unexplained. In the subsequent sentence, he extends the animal
domain,  complementing the  dog by the metonymies  bear, elephant,  sabretooth tiger  and
dragon.  Note  also  the  transformation  of  the  initial comparison  like  a  mad dog into  the
anaphoric metaphor this mad dog.
The political  zoo also includes mythical animals, such as hydras and dragons.  And
finally, animal-like personifications may fulfil the same function: “Moskva poklala tudy lapy
svoji  zahrebušči,  ščob znyščyty  Ukrajinu”  (Moscow laid  its  greedy paws here  to  destroy
Ukraine).32
Our last  source domain relates to ‘fire’ and its  derivatives.  Fire metaphors  play an
important role in Proximisation theory.33 The underlying conceptualisation ‘danger is fire’ is,
however, only one of quite a few different mappings: hope, enthusiasm, anger and purification
are other possible targets.34 In the polemics about the Ukrainian conflict, ‘danger’ is the only
target where fire metaphors occur. The following excerpt contains no less than five instances
of the word fire and two other words that semantically imply a fire:
(8) У нас пожар. Это не внутренний пожар. Не мы подпалили наш дом. Не люди на
Донбассе  рaзвели этот  пожар.  Этот  пожар пришел  из-  вне.…  А  Украина
граничит, в частности, с четырьмя странами членами ЕС. Помогите нам, потому
что это в  ваших интeресах.  Вы помогаете  себе,  помогая нам.  Если  пожар не
затушить здесь - он распростра- нится дальше.35
       This message follows a rather typical pattern in Ukrainian proximisation discourse: the
danger comes from outside but has already reached us and may expand elsewhere, beyond our
borders. Thus, this example works as a warning for the West and is reminiscent of example (5)
with its hint on V. Putin’s omnipresence.
         In the next quotation, the Western efforts to extinguish the fire proves counterproductive:
“during the events in Ukraine we saw many representatives of European countries and of the
US State Department acting as if they tried to extinguish the fire with oil.”36 This collocation is
a one-scope blend of the two regular collocations extinguish a fire and pour oil in(to) the fire.
Although it  looks like a conventional,  sarcastic metaphor, it  is not attested in the Russian
National Corpus.
         On the other hand, Russia may also be blamed for its inadequate behaviour in the face of
the  Ukrainian  crisis,  as  an  oppositional  Russian  politician  points  out  in  the  following
comparison:
sabretooth tiger or dragon, let us unite and resist to this mad dog, let us force it to respect the interests of the
world community!)
32 O. Ljaško, 19 September 2014.
33 Cap 2013: 62, 80 f., 123.
34 Cf. Charteris-Black 2014: 198 ff. See also Charteris-Black 2016.
35 G. Nemyrja, Verxovna Rada, 29 August 2014 (We have a fire. This is not an internal fire. It was not us who
set our house on fire. The people from Donbass did not initiate this fire. This fire came from outside… Ukraine
borders on four members of the EU. Help us, since this in your own interest. You help yourselves by helping us.
If the fire is not extinguished here, it will continue to spread).
36 V. A Vasil’ev, State Duma, 26 February 2014.
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(9) мы являемся великой державой, которая должна вести себя, по идее, как великая
держава, а не как страна, которая пытается восстановить былое могущество за
счет соседа:  когда у  него пожар,  нужно у него унести телевизор или угонять
машину.37
In this speaker’s view, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its military support for
the separatist movement in the Donbass region are paralleled to the theft of these territories
from its legitimate owner. 
A  smouldering  fuse combines  the  idea  of  ‘motion’ (the  approaching  fire)  with  an
ensuing explosion, cf. the following quotation from a debate in the Russian parliament: “It’s a
fuse  which  has  already been  smouldering  for  several  months,  now it  may explode  every
moment.”38 According to Charteris-Black’s threshold of less than 5% of occurrences in the
reference corpus39 (here: the Russian National Corpus), Russian  fitil’ ‘fuse’ in this political
meaning is a novel metaphor. This holds all the more for the collocation fitil’ tleet ‘the fuse is
smouldering’.
Explosives offer a more threatening concept than mere fire, therefore they often occur
in  proximisation  imagery.  In  a  Russian  TV  show,  Ukrainian  politicians  are  accused  of
tolerating  a  terrifying  explosive  development:  “vremja  pokažet  tu  strašnuju  minu
zamedlennogo dejstvija, kotoruju segodnja oni vospitali v svoej strane” (time will show the
terrible  delayed-action mine that they have brought up40 in their country).41 One may only
surmise that what this speaker has in mind is the approaching danger of an alleged fascist
regime in Ukraine. The leader of the Russian communist party even considers the outcome of
the  Majdan riots  a greater danger than the nuclear catastrophe of  Černobyl’:  “Na Ukraine
vzorvalsja političeskij Černobyl’, po svoim posledstvijam on gorazdo opasnee jadernogo” (In
Ukraine, a  political Černobyl’ exploded, whose consequences are way more dangerous than
the nuclear one).42
Conclusions
This study discussed two different types of ‘proximisation’ imagery (metaphors, metonymies
and comparisons) that affect the Ukrainian territorial integrity. ‘Motion’ is not a threatening
concept  in  itself,  nor  is  it  the  sub-concept  ‘border-crossing’:  here  the  danger  had  to  be
expressed contextually  except with ‘red lines’ and ‘expiry dates’, which presuppose some
kind  of  prohibition.  ‘Disease’,  ‘wild  animals’,  ‘fire’ and  ‘explosion’,  on  the  other  hand,
unequivocally signal a threat scenario. In some examples, two or more sources were blended
or intertwined, such as ‘motion’, ‘fire’ and ‘explosion’ or ‘animals’ and ‘disease’. Moreover,
as  examples  (4)  and  (6)  showed,  ‘motion’  may  also  combine  with  the  target  domains
‘destruction’ and ‘subordination’.  Sometimes we find a  combination of source and target
within one NP, cf. “ulcer of totalitarianism.”
37 G. Gudkov, Dožd’, 29 August 2014 (We are a great power which should behave like a great power and not
like a country that tries to restore its former power at the expense of its neighbour: when there is a fire at his
place, one carries away his televisor or steals his car).
38 O. Nilov, State Duma, 27 February 2014.
39 Charteris-Black (2014: 179).
40The metaphorical clash of  bringing up a mine looks very much like a catachresis. Native speakers find this
combination bizarre.
41D. Orlov, TV show Vremja pokažet, 16 September 2014.
42G. Zjuganov, State Duma, 5 February 2014.
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It does not come as a surprise that the same source domains are used by the Russian
side to depict the dangers threatening the Russians on Ukrainian territory. The study also
illustrated the interplay of metaphors, metonymies and comparisons: in example (4), it was
the metonymical boot that caused the destruction, and example (7) showed the typical pattern
of  an  initial  comparison (‘like  a  mad  dog’)  engendering  the  metaphor  ‘mad  dog’ in  the
subsequent text.  On the whole, the imagery used was not innovative in the sense sketched
out by Charteris-Black (2014) but appeared in fresh contextual combinations.
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